



With Hijacking of Aircraftt
When dealing with the problem of aircraft hijacking it is easy to move
right away to the question: How can hijackings be stopped? Before doing
so, however, it is worthwhile to stress a proposition that, surprisingly,
needs restressing; namely, that we are dealing with a very serious threat to
human life. Despite all the talk about hijacking, there are quite a few who
consider hijacking to be a nuisance, an annoyance or perhaps even a bit of
semi-pleasant excitement, but not a crime of chilling potential for disaster.
The record of zero passenger fatalities to date has surely fostered this
belief.
Yet what circumstances more inimical to human life can you imagine
than these: An armed, mentally unbalanced individual, frequently with a
criminal record, is in control of a large passenger aircraft which he cannot
operate. The aircraft is high in the air. In today's crowded airways-many
of which pass over large population centers-it is no longer responsive to
ground control. Add to these considerations the further ones of possible
weather and fuel problems en route to the hijacker's destination, and of
weather, landing facility and language problems at that destination. More-
over, and entirely apart from the safety consideration, there is the possi-
bility that a hijacking to one of several countries in the world that might
choose not to return the aircraft or its passengers right away could occa-
sion a serious international political crisis.
Thus, hijacking-or what to do about hijacking-confronts the govern-
ment of the United States with serious challenges that require the harness-
ing of its technological, political and legal skills. As a beginning, however,
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we might just look at the "facts of hijacking," so to speak-how many have
there been; what kinds of people commit them; what are their motivations;
and what has happened to the hijackers, both in this country and else-
where. In dealing with these matters, reference will be made mainly to
hijackings to Cuba, because that is where the problem has been most
serious.
Since May, 1961, and up to August 9, 1969, there have been 83 actual
or attempted hijackings to Cuba-taking into account all types of aircraft
and all of the nations involved. Seventy-three of these have succeeded. Of
the 83 actuals or attempts, 54 have involved aircraft of United States
registry, and 29 have involved aircraft of foreign registry (principally Latin
American). Of the 54 U.S.-registered aircraft, 45 have been commercial
transport and nine have been general aviation aircraft. Ten United States
flag carriers have had their planes hijacked to Cuba, with National Air
Lines and Eastern Air Lines tied in an unenviable lead (13 each). All told,
during the entire eight-year period, close to 3,000 passengers and crew
members have been hijacked to Cuba on American flag carriers.
Rather boradly speaking, hijackings seem to have occurred in waves.
There was (for then) a considerable wave between 1961 and 1962; another
between 1964 and 1965; and a tremendous surge in the latter part of 1968
and the early part of 1969. In fact, there were more during this last period
than during the entire preceding seven years. Since last winter and early
spring, hijackings have leveled off again. But they still occur at an average
rate of about four a month.
The hijackers themselves seem to fall into three broad categories: men-
tally disturbed persons; fugitives from justice; and persons wishing to
return to Cuba. The mentally disturbed usually have been personal and
professional failures, and suffer from varying degrees of paranoia and/or
schizophrenia. To them, hijacking offers a long-sought means of proving
themselves. But it is interesting to note that, during 1969, at least, five out
of six attempted hijackings by such mentally disturbed people failed. Dur-
ing the course of 1969 there has been a change of the type of person who
has undertaken the crime. Late last year, most of the hijackers were
mentally disturbed. During the late winter and spring, criminal types pre-
dominated. And more recently, there seem to be a growing number of
Cuban expatriates, although these still are a definite minority among hi-
jackers.
There appear to be several discernible motives for hijacking. The pre-
dominant one seems to be some combination of political motivation, neu-
rotic make-up, and the desire for a safe haven in what is believed to be a
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Cuban utopia. Next, mental disturbance. Next, some private reason for
wishing to go to (principally return to) Cuba. And finally, fleeing justice.
What has happened to the hijackers? Thirteen persons who have hi-
jacked or attempted to hijack U.S.-registered aircraft during the heavy
incidence of hijacking of the past year are in the custody of the United
States. Four of these returned to the United States, one of his own volition.
The other three had left Cuba to go to Canada and ended up in our hands.
The remainder were apprehended within U.S. jurisdiction after unsuccess-
ful attempts at hijacking. Six of these thirteen have been convicted for
varying offenses, though not air piracy. Sentences have ranged from in-
determinate to 15 years. Prosecution is pending in the remaining seven
cases which are awaiting the outcome of mental examinations.
So far as we know, the remaining hijackers still are in Cuba, although we
have heard that one or two of them have gotten to Europe. As to what has
happened to them in Cuba, we have to work on bits and pieces of in-
formation. The Cuban government publicly has said very little on the
subject. However, it seems fairly obvious that they are not accorded hero
status, or otherwise given any prominence. We have information that some
of them were put to work in the cane fields. A member of the Black
Panther organization who had hijacked a plane to Cuba recently gave a
press interview in Havana in which he roundly condemned the Cuban
government for the way he had been treated in Cuba. According to him,
Black Panthers were "isolated and imprisoned" in Cuba, although seeking
political asylum there. And he was on his way to a work camp in the
interior. Alban Barkley Truitt, who was returned to the United States via
Canada, mentioned having been put in solitary confinement for some peri-
od of time. He was quoted as having said that anybody who hijacked an
airplane to Cuba might be killed. Statements of this nature, as well as other
information available to us, all seem to comport with a statement attributed
to a high Cuban government official in a Miami Herald story last summer
to the effect that the Cuban government welcomes immigrants to Cuba,
"but not if they have to take an airplane to do it."
So far, we have been discussing aircraft highjacking in the Western
Hemisphere. However, that is only part of a broader problem. There have
been hijackings of commercial transports in Europe, Africa and the Philip-
pines. And there have been incidents not involving hijacking, but rather
armed intervention, involving commercial aircraft at Athens, Zurich, Bei-
rut, Frankfort and Karachi. In these, the flag aircraft of various other
nations have been bombed, machine-gunned or burned on the
ground.
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Thus, hijacking and other forms of armed intervention involving aircraft
are matters of serious concern to the entire international community-not
just to the United States, and not just to the countries so far involved.
These acts threaten a transportation system which is at once terribly
important to the smooth running of a peaceful, progressing world, and
terribly fragile.
In deciding how it could best deal with this problem, the United States
government soon concluded that efforts to stop hijacking could be put into
three categories: First, detecting the would-be hijacker before he gets on
the airplane and denying him passage. Second, frustrating a mid-air attempt
by either mechanical or human means, or both. And third, deterring future
hijackers-with emphasis on punishing the successful hijacker under either
the laws of the United States or the laws of the country to which he takes
the hijacked airplane. These three methods may be briefly characterized as
those of detection, frustration and deterrence.
The principal problem so far has been perfecting a detection device that
will reliably and accurately discriminate between a weapon and other metal
objects normally carried by a person. Unexpected progress has been made
in this direction; and an over-all detection system, including such a device,
is now in the testing stage and gives considerable promise of working with
an acceptable degree of accuracy. Assuming that we can get such a system
that works reasonably well, I think that we can all sense the search and
seizure and other civil liberties problems which could stem from putting the
system into actual operation. Can a person be made to submit to the
detector -if he knows it is there-or can it be imposed on him, so to speak,
if he doesn't know that it is there? If the application of the system indicates
him to be suspect, can he be forcibly searched and forcibly denied boarding
the plane? And if he is to be searched and denied passage, which law
enforcement agency is competent to do these things?
Now, moving on to the problem of deterring future hijackers by punish-
ing past ones. Interestingly enough, the problem to date has largely been a
diplomatic one, rather than a straight-out criminal enforcement problem.
Obviously, if we are going to try to get hijackers punished in another
country, we are going to have to persuade that country to do this. We
cannot just tell another sovereign power to do it and, even more obviously,
the writ of the United States does not run to that country. As for punishing
hijackers in this country, the base problem is getting them back-right now,
getting them back from Cuba-to be punished.
When the most recent wave of hijackings began, we looked around to
see what existing international legal instruments might be available to help
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us. There were two: an extradition treaty with Cuba and the Convention
on Crimes and Certain Other Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft,
otherwise known as the Tokyo Convention. We shortly concluded that
neither would be particularly helpful.
The extradition treaty was concluded in 1904-only shortly after the
airplane was invented. It has not since been revised and, pretty obviously,
hijacking is not listed among the treaty crimes. The usual common law
crimes-including kidnapping and robbery-are listed. But the omission of
hijacking is troublesome. In this regard, it is worth noting that the govern-
ments of Cuba and Mexico have been working to conclude a reciprocal
extradition treaty pertaining specifically to hijacking, although a usual ex-
tradition treaty is in force between the two countries. Our extradition
treaty with Cuba has the usual exemption for political crimes, which would
somewhat limit its use. Furthermore, we have no diplomatic relations with
Cuba, and pursuant to international customs and usage, obligations under
an extradition treaty are suspended in the absence of diplomatic rela-
tions-probably because, as a practical matter, proceedings under an extra-
dition treaty are difficult to impossible in the absence of diplomatic rela-
tions.
The Tokyo Convention was written for several purposes other than that
of dealing with hijacking, so its treatment of the subject in Article 11 is
quite limited. The Article requires that a Member State in which a hijacked
airplane lands take all appropriate measures to restore control of the
aircraft, its passengers, crew and cargo, to the plane commander, and to
facilitate the onward movement of the aircraft. This is an extremely impor-
tant and useful international standard to establish. But the convention
makes no provision for the return of the hijacker-probably because it was
felt that this could or would be covered in individual bilateral extradition
treaties. Also, the Convention is not yet in force; accession by 12 nations
is necessary to bring it into force and only eleven have acceded.
This being the state of the relevant international law, we had to strike
out in new directions. As we saw it, our first task was to arouse the
international community to the seriousness of the threat to air trans-
portation posed by hijacking, preliminary to seeking concerted in-
ternational action against the crime. The obvious second task was to
induce such international action. And finally, with regard to our particular
problem, we would go to the Cubans themselves. In this last regard, we
would make several proposals, some of them falling short of our ultimate
goal of achieving the return of the hijackers, but all aimed at the alleviation
of the problem.
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In the effort to arouse the international community to the seriousness of
hijacking, we turned to the International Civil Aviation Organization,
ICAO. ICAO is an international organization of 116 member governments
which, under the general aegis of the United Nations, concerns itself with
certain technical, economic and legal aspects of international air transport.
ICAO also is a repository for several multilateral treaties affecting in-
ternational air transport.
At the 16th Assembly of ICAO in Buenos Aires in September, 1968,
the United States delegation was successful in obtaining the unanimous
passage of a resolution calling upon member states to accede to the Tokyo
Convention as soon as possible, and, in the meantime, to enforce Article
11 of the Convention as if it were in force and effect. It also called upon
the Council of ICAO to undertake a study of other means of dealing with
hijacking than the Tokyo Convention. We consider it noteworthy that the
Cuban delegate to the Assembly joined in this unanimous vote. In Decem-
ber, 1968, and again at the behest of the United States, the Council of
ICAO-the permanent body which sits in Montreal-passed a resolution
which urged all Member States to take all possible measures to prevent
hijackings, and to cooperate with any other country-Member State or
not-whose aircraft had been hijacked.
These resolutions of course are only hortatory. But we believe them to
be useful since they help in emphasizing the seriousness of the problem,
and since they are declaratory of some sort of international standard that
requires countries to deal with hijacking in a serious fashion and to return
the hijacked aircraft and occupants promptly.
In April, 1969, the Council passed a third resolution, this time directed
at the broader subject of armed intervention involving aircraft and in-
ternational aircraft facilities, but including hijacking. This resolution ap-
pointed a Special Committee of the Council to solicit information, advice
and recommendations with regard to acts of armed intervention from the
countries involved, and directed the Committee to report its findings and
recommendations to the Council.
Appointing a committee may seem like a cheap, ineffective step to take
in such a circumstance. But we believed that investigation by an in-
ternational organization, possibly involving an on-the-scene look, would
help to force all nations to deal with such incidents sensibly, promptly and
in a non-political way. The fact that a number of incidents had been
motivated politically made it both harder and more important to eliminate
political considerations. The substantial political content involved in the
issue was manifested by the difficulty we had in getting satisfactory terms
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of reference for this Committee. In the end, it was explicitly excused from
delving into any incident that had political ramifications, and it was left
unclear exactly what ICAO would do with the information and recommen-
dations passed back.
In any event, this Committee opened its first meeting August 4 in
Montreal, and has since been hearing testimony from various aviation
experts on the subject of armed intervention involving aircraft, including
hijacking.
To the end of inducing concerted international action against hijacking,
in November, 1968-against the background of the ICAO Assembly reso-
lution of the preceeding September-we proposed in the Council of ICAO
a protocol to the Tokyo Convention which would require Member States
to return a hijacker to the state of registration of the hijacked aircraft
without regard to considerations of political asylum. Almost needless to
say, we ran into rather heavy going when it became clear that our proposal
abrogated the historic right to political asylum in relation to hijackers.
Frankly, we crossed this bridge ourselves only after considerable
soul-searching. But it had become our judgment, after many weeks of
mental and moral agonizing, that the magnitude of this 20th Century crime
outweighed the right of political asylum which had come to us sacrosanct
through the ages. When the November meeting of ICAO broke up, we
stood almost alone in our contention that hijackers were not entitled to
political asylum. The position of the great majority of states was that the
state in which the hijacker landed had the prerogative of determining
whether political asylum should be granted; and that this prerogative
should not be abridged by an international commitment.
We meet again in late September. We obviously must consider, in
preparing for this meeting, the heavy objection to any limitation of the right
to political asylum. But I have reason to believe that we can work out some
type of multilateral undertaking- whether called a protocol to the Tokyo
Convention or something else-which will provide considerably more de-
terrence to hijacking than currently is provided by international legal in-
struments.
Since our-that is the U.S.-problem is with hijackings to Cuba, we
decided to approach the Cubans. In the absence of diplomatic relations
with Cuba, we have worked through the Swiss Embassy in Havana.
Our first move was to suggest a less cumbersome and time-consuming
procedure for the return of the hijacked aircraft. For the past two or three
years, when a hijacked plane landed at Havana, the Cubans would dis-
embark the passengers and their baggage and send them to a hotel in the
resort town of Verdadaro on the north coast of Cuba, and keep them there
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until a plane or planes could be sent down to get them. In the meantime,
the crew of the aircraft flew it back empty to Miami. While the plane was
usually returned in two or three hours, it almost always took considerably
longer, sometimes one or two days, to get the passengers back.
Some time ago, we suggested that the passengers and their baggage be
returned on the hijacked aircraft. After considering the matter for some
months, the Cubans responded that, if the government of the United
States, the airline involved and the pilot in command of the plane all agreed
to accept the total safety responsibility for the return of the passengers on
the hijacked aircraft, the Cubans would send them back in it. Since then,
the planes and passengers have been returned in two or three hours.
Another move was to suggest that Cuban residents of the United States
who wished to go or return to Cuba be transported down there on the
southbound trip of the so-called Refugee Airlift. The Refugee Airlift is
operated, under contract with the State Department for the general pur-
pose of bringing Cuban refugees to the United States. It operates empty
from the United States to Cuba. Companion to our proposal with regard to
the Refugee Airlift, we also proposed that the Cuban government review
lists of names of Cuban residents of the United States who wished to
return to Cuba and inform us whether it would admit any of the persons
listed. The means of getting them back to Cuba were left open. We would
compile such lists and submit them periodically. In the instance of each
proposal, the underlying thought was that there might be potential hijackers
among discontented Cubans resident in the United States; and that, if we
could arrange for their return by other means, they would not hijack
airplanes to get back. As a matter of fact, we know of at least one actual
hijacker in this category.
The eventual Cuban response to the Airlift proposal was that they would
not go along with it. Apparently, among other considerations, they appre-
hended a considerable and unmanageable influx of returning Cubans. How-
ever, rather recently, the Cubans did inform us that they would take back a
limited number of specific persons named on the lists which we had
furnished them, but via Mexico and not on the Refugee Airlift plane.
It was necessary for us to seek Cuban agreement to both of the propos-
als which I have just described because the Refugee Airlift is operated
pursuant to an agreement between the United States (represented by the
Swiss Embassy in Havana) and Cuba, and any change in its terms requires
the agreement of both parties. More important, even, the Cuban govern-
ment is, of course, the sole judge of whom it will allow to enter, or reenter,
Cuba.
More fundamental to our own particular problem, we proposed to the
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Cubans that we conclude with them some arrangement-formal or in-
formal -for the return of hijackers. I regret to report that the response to
this to date has been that the Cuban government has no present interest in
such an arrangement. And that is where the matter stands at the moment.
Now, what remains to be done?
There is no single solution to the problem. Rather, we must continue to
push along all of the lines we can think of as being helpful.
The coming into effect of the Tokyo Convention, accession to it by an
increasing number of states, and the enforcement of its hijacking provisions
by all states, whether or not members of the Convention, would at least
assure the safety of passengers and air crewmen after a hijacking had taken
place.
The ICAO Committee on Armed Intervention Involving Aircraft must
prosecute its mission with energy and resolve. It must not be overly
sensitive to any political ramifications of a given incident which is brought
to its attention. A threat to air transportation is a threat to air trans-
portation- whether politically motivated or not, whether with political
overtones or without them.
Finally, the nations of the world-certainly the aviation nations of the
world - must get together on a protocol to the Tokyo Convention, or some
other multilateral instrument, which will assure either the return of a
hijacker to the state of registration of the hijacked aircraft, or his punish-
ment in the receiving state. In this connection, amendment of the federal
air piracy statute to delete the death penalty may have to be considered, in
order to make it easier for some nations to return a hijacker.
In any event, hijacking can probably best be deterred by the reasonably
certain knowledge, on the part of the would-be hijacker, that he will not
find a psychological or legal safe port, but rather that he will pay heavily
for his commission of the act. Given the increasingly boundless reach of
modern aircraft, given the international dimension of civil aviation, the
provision of this deterrence is the primary responsibility of the in-
ternational community. That community must get on with this task. It must
turn against hijacking as it once turned against another, older, but no more
dangerous form of piracy at sea.
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